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The recognition of land title and demarcation of indigenous peoples’ an-
cestral lands and the guarantee of the rights of consultation and free, 
prior and informed consent (FPIC) in the context of large infrastructure 
projects represent some of the major challenges for indigenous commu-
nities in the Amazon States. Regrettably, indigenous cultures are still 
viewed today by some governments as barrier to economic develop-
ment. Most Amazon States have introduced legislation requiring consul-
tation and, in more limited circumstances, indigenous peoples’ prior and 
informed consent in their federal legislation concerning the planning 
stages of development projects. However, the levels of effectiveness of 
implementation vary considerably between countries in the region.1
In the case of Brazil,2 the lack of meaningful and culturally appropri-
ate consultation and FPIC evidences the country’s non- implementation 
of international obligations, in particular, the requirements for consul-
tation established under the 1969 Inter- American Convention on 
Human Rights,3 the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Rights,4 as well as the 2007 United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).5
Ք1See MA Tigre and S Slinger, ‘Voice in the Development of Amazonia: The Constitutional 
Rights to Participation of Indigenous Peoples’ in W Leal Filho, VT King and I Borges de 
Lima (eds), Indigenous Amazonia, Regional Development and Territorial Dynamics: 
Contentious Issues (Springer 2020) 7.
Ք2There are 305 indigenous ethic groups and over 274 different indigenous languages in 
Brazil, with a total of nearly 900,000 individuals (or 0.47 percent of the Brazilian 
population) who identify as indigenous. The vast majority of indigenous reserved land 
(98.5 percent) is located in the Amazon. See <https://www.iwgia.org/en/brazil.html>.
Ք3American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 
18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR).
Ք4Convention (No 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) 1650 UNTS 383 
(ILO Convention 169).
Ք5UNGA ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 
October 2007) (UNDRIP).
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The recognition of land title and demarcation of indigenous peoples’ ancestral lands 
and the guarantee of the rights of consultation and free, prior and informed consent 
in the context of large infrastructure projects represent some of the major challenges 
for indigenous peoples and communities in the Amazon States. These challenges 
have been exacerbated by the election of the current Brazilian federal government 
in power since January 2019. Yet a significant development with the potential to 
strengthen participatory environmental governance in the region followed the adop-
tion and entry into force in April 2021 of the 2018 Regional Agreement on Access to 
Environmental Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. This article will argue that national environmental impact assess-
ment and licensing procedures must integrate a human rights approach to project 
impact assessments to safeguard the protection of the environment and indigenous 
peoples’ fundamental rights.
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This article aims to assess the challenges posed by weaknesses in 
the existing legal framework applicable to indigenous peoples’ par-
ticipation in the planning and post- planning stages of development 
projects in the Brazilian Amazon.6 The article examines whether the 
current legal framework enables the effective protection and asser-
tion of indigenous peoples’ land and environmental rights and the 
extent to which international and regional human rights law can pro-
vide effective remedies for human rights violations faced by indige-
nous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon. Moreover, this article 
highlights the particular challenges facing the protection of indige-
nous peoples’ rights since the election of the current Brazilian fed-
eral government. The current government has been marked by 
anti- environment and anti- indigenous rhetoric, as reflected in the 
adoption of regressive laws and policies, leading to increases in de-
forestation rates by expanding plantations of soy and other export 
crops, and building of new roads, dams and mines and the desire to 
open indigenous lands to agribusiness and miners.7
The article argues that environmental impact assessment (EIA) and 
licensing procedures must incorporate a human rights- based frame-
work to safeguard the protection of indigenous peoples’ fundamental 
rights. Accordingly, achieving and maintaining a social licence to oper-
ate requires an ongoing process of community engagement aimed at 
achieving and building trust relationships with the impacted communi-
ties with the overriding goal of reaching meaningful consultation and 
FPIC.8 Moreover, a human rights impact assessment (HRIA) frame-
work would seek to ensure that projects designed to expand access to 
natural resources are conceived, planned and implemented with the 
objective of protecting, respecting and fulfilling human rights in the 
Brazilian Amazon9 in line with the principles of due diligence in corpo-
rate decision making, effective remedies and access to justice as set 
out in the 2011 United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights.10 An HRIA aims to integrate human rights princi-
ples such as non- discrimination, meaningful participation, transpar-
ency and accountability into the project planning and decision 
making.11 Although HRIA draws on impact assessment practices such 
as environmental, social and health impact assessment, there are im-
portant differences between them. For example, while in many 
jurisdictions public participation tends to be a standard requirement in 
impact assessment processes such as EIA and social impact assess-
ment (SIA), a human rights- based approach creates further emphasis 
on participation in terms of questioning, broadening the points in time 
at which participation occurs, the level of information sharing involved 
in participation and consultation activities and empowerment and ca-
pacity building of individuals to participate in the impact assessment 
process.12
The argument advanced by this article has significant implica-
tions for the advancement of human rights of indigenous peoples’ 
rights not only in the Amazon but also in other regions, particu-
larly concerning the protection of sites of high ecological and bio-
diversity significance. A human rights- based framework creates 
the essential procedural mechanisms required for the exercise 
of indigenous peoples’ right to self- determination and sustain-
able management of natural resources. By aiming to incorporate 
effective and meaningful participatory rights in project impact 
assessments, a human rights approach would secure the sustain-
able living and community engagement in project planning and 
post- planning stages, building a relationship of trust between local 
and indigenous communities and project developers, the empow-
erment of local actors and capacity building aimed at preventing 
human rights violations and environmental harms associated with 
project development. Moreover, a HRIA framework would enable 
grievances to be addressed at an earlier stage of project develop-
ment and thereby reducing the reputational and economic risks of 
companies, governments and financial institutions associated with 
litigation and civil society campaigns.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the driv-
ers for deforestation in the Amazon and the extent to which they 
impact on indigenous peoples’ land rights in Brazil. Section 3 turns 
attention to the development and application of the rights to partic-
ipation, consultation and to FPIC in Brazil. Section 4 presents one 
specific case study – the deeply criticized and controversial con-
struction of the Belo Monte dam in the Brazilian state of Para in the 
Amazon basin region – to illustrate the deficiencies in Brazil’s imple-
mentation of international minimum standards for indigenous par-
ticipation, consultation and FPIC rights. Section 5 compares Brazil’s 
legislative framework with similar instruments concerning public 
consultation and FPIC in two other Amazon States (Peru and 
Colombia) and discusses how far the adoption of the 2018 Regional 
Agreement on to Information, Public Participation and Justice in 
Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú 
Agreement)13 may improve participatory environmental governance 
in the region. Section 7 concludes.
Ք6See VO Mazzuoli and SM Galvão, ‘A proteção internacional do meio ambiente no 
Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica’ (Thomson Reuters 2011) 39.
Ք7L Ferrante and PM Fearnside, ‘Brazil Threatens Indigenous Lands’ (2020) 368 Science 
481.
Ք8P Hanna and F Vanclay, ‘Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples and the Concept of Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent’ (2013) 31 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 146.
Ք9See DS Olawuyi, ‘Energy (and Human Rights) for All: Addressing Human Rights Risks in 
Energy Access Projects’ in R Salter, CG Gonzalez and EA Kronk Warner (eds), Energy 
Justice: US and International Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2018) 73; and D Shelton, 
‘Equitable Utilization of the Atmosphere: A Rights- Based Approach to Climate Change’ 
in S Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 
2010) 91.
Ք10Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework’ (2011) <https://www.ohchr.org/docum ents/publi catio ns/guidi 
ngpri ncipl esbus iness hr_en.pdf> Principles 4, 15(b) and 17.
Ք11See World Bank, ‘Human Rights Impact Assessment: A Review of the Literature, 
Differences with Other Forms of Assessments and Relevance for Development’ (World 
Bank 2013).
Ք12Danish Institute for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Impact Assessment: Guidance and 
Toolbox’ (2020) <https://www.human rights.dk/sites/ human rights.dk/files/ media/ docum 
ent/DIHR%20HRI A%20Too lbox_Welco me_and_Intro ducti on_ENG_2020.pdf>.
Ք13Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in 
Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (adopted 4 March 2018, 







Historically, as well as in contemporary times, the Brazilian develop-
ment model has been based on heavy industrialization and depend-
ence on natural resources. Infrastructural improvements allowed 
both easier access to the forest and the cheaper transportation of 
goods produced in the Amazon, therefore, driving large- scale agri-
cultural activity. There is a direct correlation between the decreasing 
costs of transportation between the Amazon and the rest of Brazil 
and the increasing rates of deforestation.14 The federal government 
has adopted a number of schemes to fund development- oriented 
projects, including -m׬-u-vbѲ, a package of 338 projects through-
out Brazil that has raised US$ 43 billion to fund the building of roads, 
hydroelectric dams and other infrastructural developments to be 
implemented in the period between 2000 and 2020.15 The building 
of roads and highways – such as the Trans- Amazonia highway that 
cuts across Amazonia – facilitated access to markets and created 
further incentives for clearing of land. The National Energy Plan 
2050 (Plano Nacional de Energia 2050) launched by the Ministry of 
Mining and Energy in December 2020 foresees the construction of 
further hydroelectric projects, and some of these plans extend to 
energy provision to neighbouring Amazon States.16
One of the most significant drivers for land- use change in Brazil 
is agricultural production. Brazil is the world’s largest producer of 
soy (overtaking the United States (US) in March 2020) and second- 
largest producer of beef (after the US).17 Cattle ranching is widely 
regarded as the largest direct driver of deforestation in the Amazon 
region,18 representing about two- thirds of annual deforestation19 
and 75 per cent of deforested areas of the Amazon.20 Mining activi-
ties also put significant pressure on land planning and the environ-
ment. With the discovery of gold deposits in the Amazon in the 
1980s, there has been an increase in landless workers acting as 
small- scale surface miners or prospectors (garimpeiros) leading to 
conflicts with indigenous communities.21
It has been estimated that 17 per cent of the Brazilian Amazon’s 
original forest cover had been cleared by 2003.22 A substantial de-
cline from historically high deforestation rates in the Amazon oc-
curred from 2004 to 2012, which can be partly attributed 
(particularly after 2007) to the Plan for Prevention and Control of 
Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm),23 and partly to eco-
nomic factors such as commodity prices and the currency exchange 
rates that affect the profitability of agricultural exports.24After 
2012, deforestation accelerated significantly despite control ef-
forts.25 For example, increases in deforestation rates have been re-
ported in the period between September 2014 and January 2015, 
with deforestation rates in that period more than doubling in rela-
tion to those same months a year earlier.26 According to 
InfoAmazônia, some of the factors that contributed to the increased 
deforestation rates after 2013 include reduction in nature conserva-
tion areas, the slowdown in demarcation of indigenous lands, the 
weakness of environmental agencies and low investment in the 
PPCDAm budget 2011– 2014.27 Research conducted by the Amazon 
Environmental Research Institute suggests that the Amazon forest 
fires in 2019– 2020 can only be explained by the increase in defor-
estation.28 Of particular concern was the data released by the 
Brazilian National Institute for Space Research (INPE) in late 2019 
with evidence from satellite imagery showing a 76 per cent increase 
in deforestation compared to the same period in 2018.29 The exact 
scale of deforestation in the rainforest became clear following the 
publication of the official 2019– 2020 figures by INPE, which sug-
gested that there has been a significant rise already compared to 
2018.30 The COVID- 19 pandemic has led to further weakening of 
both environmental legislation and enforcement and has 
Ք14PM Fearnside, ‘Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia: History, Rates and Consequences’ 
(2005) 19 Conservation Biology 680.
Ք15PM Fearnside, ‘Avança Brasil: Environmental and Social Consequences of Brazil’s 
Planned Infrastructure in Amazonia’ (2002) 30 Environmental Management 735.
Ք16Peru and Bolivia in particular. See ‘Plano Nacional de Energia 2050’ (2020) <https://
www.epe.gov.br/pt/publi cacoe s- dados - abert os/publi cacoe s/Plano - Nacio nal- de- Energ 
ia- 2050>; and <https://www.gov.br/pt- br/notic ias/energ ia- miner ais- e- combu stive 
is/2020/12/plano - nacio nal- de- energ ia- 2050- e- lancado>.
Ք17See Statista, ‘Leading Soybean Producing Countries Worldwide from 2012/13 to 
2020/21’ <https://www.stati sta.com/stati stics/ 26392 6/soybe an- produ ction - in- selec 
ted- count ries- since - 1980/>; and EKHJ zu Ermgassen et al, ‘The Origins, Supply Chain 
and Deforestation Risk of Brazil’s Beef Exports’ (2020) 117 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 31770. See also D Boucher et al, 
‘The Root of the Problem: What’s Driving Tropical Deforestation Today?’ (Union of 
Concerned Scientists 2011).
Ք18D Nepstad, CM Stickler and OT Almeida, ‘Globalization of the Amazon Soy and Beef 
Industries: Opportunities for Conservation’ (2006) 20 Conservation Biology 1595.
Ք19ibid. See also D Nepstad et al, ‘The End of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon’ 
(2009) 326 Science 1350.
Ք20See MMC Bustamante et al, ‘Estimating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Cattle Raising 
in Brazil’ (2012) 115 Climatic Change 559; S Margulis, ‘Causes of Deforestation of the 
Brazilian Amazon’ (World Bank 2003).
Ք21M Schmink and C Wood, Contested Frontiers in Amazonia (Columbia University Press 
1992).
Ք22Margulis (n 20).
Ք23Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm) 
<http://redd.mma.gov.br/en/legal - and- publi c- polic y- frame work/ppcdam>. The legal 
Amazon comprises ‘the states of Acre, Pará, Amazonas, Roraima, Rondônia, Amapá and 
Mato Grosso and the regions located north of the 13th parallel south in the states of 
Tocantins and Goiás and west of the 44th meridian west in the state of Maranhao’; Law 
12.651/2012 (Forest Code) art 3(1).
Ք24TAP West and PM Fearnside, ‘Brazil’s Conservation Reform and the Reduction of 
Deforestation in Amazonia’ (2021) 100 Land Use Policy 105072.
Ք25ibid.
Ք26Interview with Philip Fearnside in R Schiffman, ‘What Lies Behind the Recent Surge of 
Amazon Deforestation’ (Yale Environment 360, 9 March 2015).
Ք27InfoAmazônia, ‘A Política do Desmatamento’ (2015) <http://desma tamento. 
infoamazonia.org/analise/>; HS Ferreira, DA Serraglio and RL Maganhati Mendes, 
‘Activity of the Brazilian Judiciary in the Amazon and Cerrado Biomes Aimed at 
Combating Global Warming’ in C Voigt and Z Makuch (eds), Courts and the Environment 
(Edward Elgar 2018) 113.
Ք28Amazon Environmental Research Institute, ‘Amazon Deforested Area to be Burned in 
2020 May Exceed 4.5 Thousand km2’ (8 June 2020) <https://ipam.org.br/amazo n- defor 
ested - area- to- be- burne d- in- 2020- may- excee d- 4- 5- thous and- km2/>.
Ք29See INPE, ‘Programas Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais’ <http://queim adas.dgi.
inpe.br/queim adas/porta l- stati c/situa cao- atual/>.
Ք30See ibid; T Phillips, ‘Amazon Deforestation Surges to 12- year High under Bolsonaro’ 
(The Guardian, 30 November 2020).
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contributed to further increases in deforestation in the Amazon in 
2020.31 Unfortunately, indigenous lands have been disproportion-
ately impacted by high rates of deforestation in the Amazon. The 
land of the Ituna- Itatá indigenous group living in voluntary isolation 
in the Amazon was the most deforested indigenous land in Brazil in 
2019, with 120 km2 of forests cleared, a figure six times higher than 
the Kayapó Indigenous Territory, which was the group second- most 
affected by the high rates of deforestation.32
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The various pressures on land use and drivers for deforestation 
significantly undermine indigenous peoples’ land rights in Brazil. 
In the past few decades, indigenous peoples’ land rights recog-
nized under international law and the Brazilian 1988 Constitution33 
have been compromised by a series of Brazilian laws and policies 
aimed at advancing agrarian reform and economic 
development.34
Historically, uti possidetis juris has been raised as a legal basis for 
the expropriation of indigenous lands based primarily on concepts of 
effective occupation of land.35 The adoption of the Brazilian 
Constitution was a landmark development for the protection of in-
digenous peoples’ rights in the country and has been praised for 
largely breaking away from the integrationist stance of previous do-
mestic laws.36 Those advances in indigenous peoples’ constitutional 
rights can be partly attributed to the work of the indigenous delega-
tions who provided strong lobbying, supported by the Catholic 
Church, before Congress in the negotiation process of the 
Constitution that started in February 1987.37 However, it is notable 
that the drafting process of the Constitution was marked by a lack of 
indigenous peoples’ participation and direct representation in 
Congress.38
Although the Brazilian Constitution states that ‘those lands tra-
ditionally occupied by the Indians belong to the Brazilian State’,39 
Chapter 8 of the Constitution – which is dedicated to the rights of 
indigenous peoples – states that indigenous lands are ‘inalienable 
and untransferable’ and the rights thereto are not subject to statute 
of limitation.40 Moreover, Article 231 of the Constitution states that 
indigenous peoples shall have ‘their original rights to the lands they 
traditionally occupy’41 and that they ‘shall have the exclusive usu-
fruct of the riches of the soil, the rivers and the lakes existing 
therein’.42 The Constitution also adds an important environmental 
dimension to indigenous property rights by linking the exercise of 
indigenous land rights to the preservation of the natural environ-
ment.43 It was only following difficult negotiations and a compro-
mise between political parties that the adopted text of the 
Constitution does not deny the indigenous constitutional rights and 
guarantees to ‘acculturated Indians’.44 Indigenous peoples’ land 
rights are also enshrined in Brazilian secondary legislation, which 
provides them with a regime of autonomy and self- government. 
Under Article 22 of the ‘Indian Statute’ (Estatuto do Indio),45 indige-
nous peoples who have permanent possession of the lands that they 
inhabit also have exclusive usufruct rights concerning natural re-
sources and all existing utilities within those lands. It is also recog-
nized that indigenous peoples may apply their traditional laws in the 
management of their lands.
Brazil ratified ILO Convention 169 on 22 July 2002,46 and is one 
of the signatories of the UNDRIP. ILO Convention 169 is the only 
legally binding international agreement specifically aimed at giving 
effect to indigenous peoples’ rights currently in force. The 
Convention provides for recognition of indigenous land tenure sys-
tems, which typically are based on customary rules. Article 14(1) of 
the Convention affirms that ‘the rights of ownership and possession 
of [indigenous peoples] over the lands which they traditionally oc-
cupy shall be recognised’ and that ‘measures shall be taken in appro-
priate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use 
lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have tra-
ditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activi-
ties’.47 The UNDRIP similarly aims to protect indigenous land and 
Ք31Data from INPE: <http://terra brasi lis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashb oard/alert s/legal/ amazo n/
daily/>; See MM Vale et al, ‘The COVID- 19 Pandemic as an Opportunity to Weaken 
Environmental Protection in Brazil’ (2021) 255 Biological Conservation 108994. See 
further MA Tigre, ‘COVID- 19 and Amazonia: Rights- Based Approaches for the Pandemic 
Response’ (2021) 30 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental 
Law.
Ք32Vale et al (n 31).
Ք33Brazilian Federal Constitution 1988 (Brazilian Constitution).
Ք34See in particular the Land Statute, Law 4.504 of 30 November 1964; the National 
Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform created by Decree 1.110 of 9 July 1970; 
and the reforms introduced to the Forest Code, Law 12.651 of 25 May 2012.
Ք35For a discussion of the implications of uti possidetis juris for indigenous peoples’ land 
rights in Latin America, see further B Garcia, The Amazon from an International Law 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2011) 51– 54. See generally MN Shaw, ‘The 
Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’ (1996) 67 British Yearbook 
of International Law 75.
Ք36S Rodrigues Pinto and AC Zema de Resende, ‘30 Anos da Constituicao Federal 
Brasileira – Direitos dos Povos Indigenas sob Ameaca’ in L de Oliveira Xavier, C 
Dominguez Avilla and V Fonseca (eds), 	bu;b|ovl-movĶb7-7-mb-;(boѲ;m1b-mou-vbѲķ
Estudos Interdisciplinares (CRV 2018) 75.
Ք37JMG Wagner, ‘Direitos Indigenas na Constituicao Brasileira de 1988 (e outros ensaios)’ 
(CIMI 1989).
Ք38On the history of the negotiations of indigenous peoples’ constitutional rights, see 
ibid; and Pinto and de Resende (n 36).





Ք44Pinto and de Resende (n 36) 25.
Ք45Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973 (Law 6.001/73).
Ք46ILO Convention 169 (n 4) was ratified by 23 States at the time of writing. Virtually all 
Latin American States with large indigenous population have ratified the ILO 
Convention. Among the Amazon States, only Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela have 
ratified the Convention. See <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/norml ex/en/f?p=1000:11300 
:0::NO:11300 :P11300_INSTR UMENT_ID:312314>.
Ք47ILO Convention 169 (n 4) art 15(1)- (2).
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natural resource rights by calling on States to ensure the conserva-
tion and protection of the environment and the productive capacity 
of their lands or territories and resources,48 as well as the right to 
redress by means that can include restitution or (when this is not 
possible) just, fair and equitable compensation for lands, territories 
and resources which have been ‘confiscated, taken, occupied, used 
or damaged’.49 Although non- binding, some of the indigenous peo-
ples’ rights recognized under the UNDRIP are regarded to have 
evolved to customary international law status.50 Several provisions 
recognizing indigenous land rights in the UNDRIP and ILO 
Convention 169 are largely replicated in the 2016 American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.51 The American 
Declaration states that indigenous peoples have ‘the right to the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired’52 and that ‘States shall give 
legal recognition and protection to these lands, rights and natural 
resources’.53
Indigenous land rights are supervised and enforced in Brazil by 
the federal agency National Indigenous Foundation (FUNAI), yet the 
ability of FUNAI to effectively supervise and enforce indigenous 
rights has been compromised by continuous underfunding and polit-
ical pressures, especially in recent years.54 FUNAI also oversees the 
process of demarcation of indigenous lands in accordance with 
Article 67 of the Brazilian Constitution.55 Yet the process of demar-
cation has not been able to prevent illegal invasions of indigenous 
lands.56 Brazilian President Bolsonaro openly defends the mining of 
areas in the Amazon giving further impetus to illegal incursions into 
indigenous lands.57 The government has proposed Bill 191/2020 
which would allow mining in indigenous lands,58 a practice which is 
presently prohibited – or subject to significant restrictions – under 
national law.59
There is a strong socio- environmental case not only for main-
taining but also increasing demarcation of indigenous lands. 
According to a 2021 study, almost half (45 per cent) of the remaining 
intact forests (large undegraded forest areas) in the Amazon Basin 
are in indigenous territories.60 Demarcated indigenous lands repre-
sent 24 per cent of Brazil’s Amazon biome, thus, protecting more 
than the 14 per cent that is in federal ‘conservation units’ (protected 
areas for biodiversity).61 In a notable example, the Kayapó land in the 
southwest region of the Brazilian Amazon inhabited by about 9,000 
indigenous people is one of the largest protected areas of tropical 






Indigenous peoples’ participatory rights have evolved incrementally 
in the past three decades through particular international declara-
tions and treaties recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples. 
These rights have been further consolidated in multilateral environ-
mental treaties and declarations, including those envisaging partici-
patory ‘access rights’ (i.e. access to justice, to public participation in 
decision making and to environmental information), which are based 
on Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.63 Most recently, such rights were incorporated in the 
Escazú Agreement adopted under the auspices of the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
The right to consultation is enshrined in the ILO Convention 169, 
which employs different standards ranging from consultation to par-
ticipation and, in the case of relocation, informed consent. According 
to Article 6(2) of ILO Convention 169, consultation must be under-
taken ‘in good faith … in a form appropriate to the circumstances, 
Ք48ibid art 29(1).
Ք49ibid art 28(1).
Ք50See K Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International 
Law 141. See also K Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development (Duke 
University Press, 2010). A Montes and G Cisneros, ‘The United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Foundation of a New Relationship between 
Indigenous Peoples, States and Societies’ in C Charters and R Stavenhagen (eds), Making 
the Declaration Work: The United States Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(Transaction Publisher/Central Books 2009) 138.
Ք51Organization of American States (OAS), ‘American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ AG/RES.2888 (XLVI- O/16) (15 June 2016) <https://www.iitc.org/
wp- conte nt/uploa ds/AG071 50E06_web.pdf>.
Ք52ibid art XXV(2).
Ք53ibid art XXV(4).
Ք54D Phillips, ‘Bolsonaro Picks for Funai Agency Horrifies Indigenous Leaders’ (The 
Guardian, 21 July 2019).
Ք55Brazilian Constitution (n 33) art 67. According to FUNAI, at present 488 indigenous 
lands have been demarcated, representing 12.2 percent of the national territory: <http://
www.funai.gov.br/index.php/nossa s- acoes/ demar cacao - de- terra s- indig enas?limit start 
=0#>.
Ք56J Plummer, ‘The Yanomami: Illegal Mining, Law, and Indigenous Rights in the Brazilian 
Amazon’ (2017) 27 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 479. On the 
implications of REDD+ projects to indigenous land rights in the Brazilian Amazon, see B 
Garcia et al, ‘REDD+ and Forest Protection on Indigenous Lands in the Amazon’ (2021) 
30 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law.
Ք57See International Work group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘Indigenous Peoples in Brazil’ 
<https://www.iwgia.org/en/brazil.html>.
Ք58Bill 191 of 2020.
Ք59See Section 4.
Ք60Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and Fund for the 
Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean, ‘Forest 
Governance by Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. An Opportunity for Climate Action in 
Latin America and the Caribbean’ (FAO 2021) <https://doi.org/10.4060/cb2953en>.
Ք61Ferrante and Fearnside (n 7).
Ք62K Taylor, ‘Improving Substantive and Procedural Protections for Indigenous Rights in 
REDD+ Projects: Possible Lessons from Brazil’ (2015) 5 Journal of Sustainable 
Development Law and Policy 32.
Ք63Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in ‘Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development’ UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I) (12 
August 1992) Principle 10.
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with the objective of achieving agreement or consent’.64 Under the 
Convention, States must also guarantee the protection of indige-
nous peoples’ rights to natural resources throughout their territo-
ries, including their right ‘to participate in the use, management and 
conservation’ of the resources.65 Participation at the broadest level 
of governance (including in national parliamentary debates) must not 
supplant local participation in connection with specific projects. This 
implies that national procedures regarding project approval and de-
velopment – such as EIA and strategic environmental assessment – 
must recognize the right of consultation of indigenous peoples.66 
The UNDRIP also recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to par-
ticipate in decision making in matters that could impact on their 
rights – through representatives chosen by themselves in accor-
dance with their own procedures – as well as to maintain and de-
velop their own indigenous decision- making institutions.67 States 
should consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peo-
ples concerned through their own representative institutions to ob-
tain their FPIC68 before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.69 It is, thus, recog-
nized in both ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP that consultation 
is an obligation when indigenous peoples’ lands and resources im-
peratives are concerned.70 In this vein, James Anaya, former UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008– 
2014), argues that the ‘widespread acceptance of the norm of con-
sultation demonstrates that it has become part of customary 
international law’.71
With the passage of Decree no. 5.051/2004,72 Brazil implemented 
ILO Convention 169, including by transposing the obligations of con-
sultation and participation as well as FPIC in the context of certain 
developmental activities. In June 2012, the Brazilian congress passed 
the National Policy on Territorial and Environmental Governance/
Management in Indigenous Lands’ (PNGATI)73with the overall aim of 
advancing and securing indigenous consultation and participation in 
the planning stages of development projects. The PNGATI aims to im-
prove the environmental governance and management on indigenous 
lands and to ‘guarantee and promote the protection, recovery, con-
servation and sustainable use of natural resources in Indigenous re-
serves and territories, assuring the integrity of indigenous patrimony, 
improvement of the quality of life, and proper conditions for the phys-
ical and cultural reproduction of actual and future generations of in-
digenous peoples, respecting their sociocultural autonomy’.74 Two 
important concepts are introduced by this Decree: ‘etno- mapping’ 
and ‘etno- zoning’, which involve the indigenous participation in map-
ping of areas of environmental, socio- cultural and productive rele-
vance for indigenous peoples based on their traditional knowledge.75 
From the perspective of participatory environmental governance, 
another important development was the passage of Law 13.123/2015 
on Genetic Heritage, Protection and Access to Traditional Knowledge, 
which advances indigenous and local communities’ participatory 
rights in the context of access and benefit sharing of genetic resources 
and the protection of indigenous traditional knowledge.76 Moreover, 
according to an Inter- American Commission of Human Rights 
(IAComHR) study, several consultation protocols have been devel-
oped with the help of civil society and the Federal Public Prosecutors’ 
Office (Ministerio Público Federal), whereby indigenous and traditional 
peoples in Brazil themselves draw up protocols establishing their 
rules, forms of participation and decision making.77
Public participation is also required in the course of environmen-
tal licensing procedures in accordance with CONAMA Resolution 
237/97.78 Unlike the PNGATI, the requirement of public participa-
tion in this resolution is not exclusive to indigenous peoples or tradi-
tional communities.79 According to the resolution, public authorities 
may organize public hearings at their own initiative, if requested by a 
civil society organization (entidade civil), by the Office of the 
Prosecutor (Ministerio Publico) or by a minimum of 50 persons.80 
Furthermore, in the course of an EIA,81 it is obligatory for the com-
munity to be involved in the decision- making process; even if it is not 
represented by an NGO. Although in general the Brazilian environ-
mental licensing procedure appears to meet international best prac-
tice standards, several problems emerge in connection with EIA 
follow- up and enforcement of provisions.82 According to a 2008 
Ք64ILO Convention 169 (n 4) art 6(2).
Ք65ibid art 15(1); see R Pereira and O Gough, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources in the 21st Century: Natural Resources Governance and the Right to 
Self- Determination of Indigenous Peoples under International Law’ (2013) 14 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 451.
Ք66See further Pereira and Gough (n 65).
Ք67UNDRIP (n 5) art 18.
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Policies’ (2005) 22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 41, 42.
Ք69UNDRIP (n 5) art 19.
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Ք77Inter- American Commission on Human Rights (IAComHR), ‘Situation of Human Rights 
of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Pan- Amazon Region’ (OAS 2019).
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Ք79‘Traditional peoples and communities’ are defined in the National Policy for 
Sustainable Development of Peoples and Traditional Communities, Decree 6.040 of 7 
February 2007, art 3(1).
Ք80Under the terms of CONAMA Resolution 1 of 23 January 1986 and CONAMA 
Resolution 9 of 3 December 1987. See LP Sirvinskas, Manual de Direito Ambiental (12th 
edn, Saraiva 2014).
Ք81Under CONAMA Resolution 237/97 (n 78) art 3, in addition to the EIA, a report of the 
environmental impacts needs to be produced containing a summary of the EIA.
Ք82P Hanna et al, ‘Improving the Effectiveness of Impact Assessment Pertaining to 
Indigenous Peoples in the Brazilian Environmental Licensing Procedure’ (2014) 46 
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World Bank report that addressed the hydropower sector in Brazil, 
in practice ‘problems include the poor quality of the EIAs submitted 
by project proponents, the subsequent uneven evaluation of the 
EIAs (by the Government), and the lack of a suitable dispute 
resolution’.83
As regards extractive activities over subsoil energy and mineral 
resources in indigenous lands, the Brazilian Constitution guarantees 
that these cannot take place without the authorization of the 
National Congress, the consultation of indigenous peoples and their 
sharing of benefits arising from exploitation of those resources.84 
Therefore, Bill 191/202085 proposed by the current Brazilian gov-
ernment breaches constitutional guarantees as well as ILO 
Convention 169, which requires consultation and FPIC of indigenous 
peoples affected by extractive industry activities.86
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The extent of the duty of consultation that accrues to indigenous 
peoples has also been intensely debated at the international level. In 
particular, it has been contended that indigenous peoples’ right to 
participation must include the right to veto decisions affecting them. 
The right of FPIC is a manifestation of the right of self- determination 
established under international law.87 Self- government is recognized 
as an overarching political dimension to the right to (internal) self- 
determination. In this vein, the UNDRIP states that:
[i]ndigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self- 
determination, have the right to autonomy or self- 
government in matters relating to their internal and 
local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing 
their autonomous functions.88
There is no agreed definition of FPIC under international law and 
practices vary considerably between States.89 Although the right to 
FPIC is currently invoked by virtually all international human rights 
bodies dealing with indigenous rights,90 a large number of States take 
the view that indigenous peoples should not have the power to veto 
projects that are considered of strategic importance for the develop-
ment of the country.91 In light of these difficulties, it has been sug-
gested that FPIC should be comprehended and applied as a process of 
continuous engagement, rather than as a one- off mechanism to obtain 
approval to proceed, or ‘consent’.92
ILO Convention 169 generally falls short of requiring the prior 
and informed consent of indigenous peoples, instead requiring 
merely that consultations are carried out and establishing the right 
to participation in decision making. Yet in the event that a project or 
activity requires the relocation of the impacted indigenous commu-
nities, this can only take place as an exceptional measure and re-
quires free and informed consent from indigenous peoples.93 Other 
provisions within the Convention, although not establishing a legal 
requirement that consent be obtained, could be read as broadly re-
quiring an element of participation of indigenous peoples with the 
view of ‘achieving agreement or consent’.94 Therefore, the State 
duty to give effect to the indigenous right to prior and informed con-
sent is largely dependent on the nature of the substantive rights 
concerned. In certain areas, such as projects involving resettlement 
or relocation of indigenous communities, the use of traditional 
knowledge95 and certain development- related activities affecting 
indigenous peoples’ traditional lands,96 international law requires 
not only that the right to consultation of indigenous peoples is fol-
lowed but also that indigenous peoples have the right to give or 
withhold their consent.97
When assessing the extent of the indigenous right to consul-
tation and FPIC, the Inter- American human rights bodies have 
articulated a duty for States to obtain the consent of indigenous 
peoples when their property rights are at issue.98 They have also 
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found that indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC exists on the basis of 
traditional land tenure.99 Thus, the Inter- American Court of 
Human Rights has articulated a link between the right to consul-
tation and full and informed consent and the right to property 
recognized in Article 21 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.100 It should be noted that the Inter- American Court has 
also articulated a connection and interdependency between in-
digenous peoples and the human right to a healthy 
environment.101
In the first case brought against Brazil before the IAComHR for 
widespread violations of indigenous peoples’ rights in the country,102 
the Yanomami case, the Commission studied the situation of the 
Yanomami people as a consequence of the devastating effects caused 
by the construction of a highway in their ancestral territory, which 
spurred access and invasion by illegal settlers and garimpeiros. The 
Commission found that Brazil violated the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man and identified violations of the basic 
human rights of the indigenous peoples’ members, including the rights 
to life and security. The subsequent process of demarcation of 
Yanomami land has been fraught with problems, resulting in a number 
of separate and disjointed areas and a lack of governmental protec-
tion.103 In the Xucuru case, the Inter- American Court found, for the 
first time in a case brought against Brazil, violations of the American 
Convention on Human Rights for violations of indigenous peoples’ 
rights. In particular, the Court held that the process of demarcation 
and registration of indigenous lands needed to conform to the Xucuru 
peoples’ own forms of decision making, values, uses and customs.104 
Moreover, the Court found that the lengthy administrative process of 
titling, demarcating and reorganizing of the Xucuru peoples was partly 
ineffective.105
Therefore, to build trust relationships with the impacted commu-
nities with a view to reaching meaningful consultation and FPIC,106 a 
human rights impact assessment framework should be applied in 
Brazil. Such a framework should be aimed at ensuring that projects 
designed to expand access to natural resources are conceived, 
planned and implemented with the objective of protecting, respect-
ing and fulfilling human rights.107 Accordingly, achieving and main-
taining a social license to operate needs to involve an ongoing 
process of community engagement in the country, especially in the 
context of economic activities in the Amazon or that affect other 
sites of national and international ecological importance.108 Although 
the HRIA framework does not in itself introduce new legal obliga-
tions beyond Brazil’s existing obligations already accepted pursuant 
to human rights and environmental treaties, it would enable the 
country and project developers to comply ex ante with its existing 
international law obligations by fully implementing human rights risk 
assessment processes.109 Although non- binding, Brazil implemented 
the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights110 
via domestic legislation in the form of Decree no. 9.571/2018.111 As 
was noted above, the UN Guiding Principles incorporate the princi-
ple of due diligence in corporate decision making when assessing 
human rights impacts of projects. The UN Guiding Principles are at 




Renewable energy makes up a considerable proportion of Brazil’s 
energy mix, with a high proportion of biofuels deployed in the trans-
port sector and hydropower used for electricity generation. As for 
hydroelectric power, the environmental and social impacts can be 
considerable, as seen in the context of the controversial Belo Monte 
dam.113 The Belo Monte project highlights the significant challenges 
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in reconciling the Brazilian government’s national energy security 
and economic growth strategies with the quest to safeguard human 
rights and environmental justice for the local and indigenous com-
munities who are dramatically impacted by large- scale infrastruc-
ture in the Amazon. This is one example of areas in which land- use 
change, planning and climate change policies could be better 
integrated.
The first plans for construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric 
power project in the river Xingu, in the state of Para, dates back to 
1975, and was met with considerable resistance.114 The Belo Monte 
dam is the third largest hydroelectric power project in the world,115 
which highlights the significant scale of the project and its actual and 
potential risks and harmful impacts. The project was finally given 
approval by Brazil’s Environment Agency, the Brazilian Institute of 
Environment and Natural Resources (IBAMA) in 2005,116 yet with-
out previous consultation with local and indigenous communities.117 
Although the dam itself is not located within demarcated indigenous 
lands, it directly affects the indigenous peoples in the surrounding 
11 indigenous lands, including by affecting their navigational rights, 
access to resources in the Xingu River and in some cases leading to 
their forced removal due to flooding and to harmful impacts on the 
environment.118 Moreover, the Belo Monte project has caused sub-
stantial harm to sacred sites of the Munduruku people. For the 
Munduruku, the destruction of those sacred places harms not only 
their cultural and spiritual survival but also the survival of all forms 
of life in the forest.119
One of the main criticisms surrounding the construction of the 
Belo Monte dam is that it lacked effective participation of the indig-
enous and local communities impacted by the project. In fact, it has 
been noted that approval was granted 3 years before publication of 
the EIA, and no consultations with indigenous peoples were ever 
carried out by the Brazilian Congress.120 As was noted by Fearnside, 
the environmental study and licensing procedure of the Belo Monte 
project amounted to ‘mere bureaucratic rubber stamps’ to legalize a 
decision that had already been made by the (federal) 
government.121
Following IBAMA’s decision on June 2011 to give the final per-
mission for the construction of the Belo Monte dam, on 14 August 
2011 the Federal Tribunal of Brazil’s Amazon region again suspended 
all work, invalidating the project’s environmental and installation li-
censes, claiming that no consultations were held with indigenous 
people prior to Congress issuing the authorization Decree 788 in 
2005. However, on 27 August 2011 – hence just 2 weeks after the 
Regional Federal Court revoked the projects’ licence – Brazil’s 
Supreme Court ordered that the work on the Belo Monte dam could 
resume.122 There were delays in finalizing the building of the dam 
due to the conflicts of interest involved.123 At least 20,000– 40,000 
people (including over 1,400 indigenous peoples) were forced to 
move from the area surrounding the Xingu River.124 In January 2016, 
the Federal Court in Altamira, state of Para, suspended the dam’s li-
cense for lack of compensation to the communities affected by the 
project.125 Moreover, in another setback to the project developers, 
another court order was issued in April 2017 suspending the license 
of the dam due to lack of appropriate sanitation. The court noted 
that Norte Energia – the consortium responsible for construction of 
the dam – was required to provide adequate sanitation as per the 
terms of its environmental licence.126
In addition to litigation before the Brazilian courts, there has 
been international oversight of the Brazilian government’s failure to 
guarantee indigenous and local communities’ rights affected by the 
Belo Monte project. A significant development in this regard hap-
pened in April 2011 when the IAComHR granted precautionary 
measures for the members of the indigenous communities of the 
Xingu River Basin in Pará. The Commission requested Brazil to im-
mediately suspend the licensing process for the Belo Monte project 
and stop any construction work until certain minimum conditions 
were met.127 Moreover, the Commission ordered Brazil: (i) to con-
duct consultation processes, in fulfilment of its international obliga-
tions – including ‘prior consultations that are free, informed, of good 
faith, culturally appropriate, and with the aim of reaching an agree-
ment – in relation to each of the affected indigenous communities 
that are beneficiaries of these precautionary measures’; and (ii) to 
guarantee that, ‘in order for this to be an informed consultation pro-
cess, the indigenous communities have access beforehand to the 
project’s Social and Environmental Impact Study, in an accessible 
format, including translation into the respective indigenous lan-
guages’.128 Despite the strong condemnation by the IAComHR of the 
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standards of consultation and public participation in the planning 
process of the Belo Monte dam, the Brazilian government reacted 
defensively suggesting that it would not comply with the IAComHR 
order for provisional measures.129 As a consequence, on 21 
December 2015, the IAComHR opened the main infringement pro-
ceedings against Brazil for violations of the Inter- American 
Convention.130 Although at the time of writing the IAComHR has not 
released a decision, it is likely that the Commission’s decision will be 
of limited effect as a measure or redress which ultimately reflects 
the limitations of human rights courts and commissions in address-
ing conflicts in a timely manner (despite the increasing use by the 
Commission of ‘precautionary measures’, as illustrated in the Belo 
Monte case).131 This is because the construction of the dam was 
completed and it became operational after November 2019,132 leav-
ing the affected communities with few available remedies apart 
from compensation and reparations for their past and present 
human rights violations.
Further international scrutiny of the Brazilian government poli-
cies in the context of the Belo Monte project happened following 
the mission of the former UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous 
Peoples, Victoria Tauli- Corpuz (2014– 2020) to Brazil in 2016. The 
Special Rapporteur expressed concerns over reports that public 
hearings on the project were grossly inadequate compared with the 
standard of consultation provided for in ILO Convention 169 and the 
UNDRIP.133 In particular, she was informed that no efforts had been 
made to obtain their FPIC, and no opportunities had been provided 
for their participation in decision making. Moreover, the current 
IAComHR Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Antonia Urrejola Noguera, following her visit to Brazil in 2018, urged 
the Brazilian government to address and quickly resolve repeated 
violations of the human rights of indigenous communities, highlight-
ing the case of the Mïratu de Paquiçamba indigenous community 
affected by the environmental damage caused by the construction 
of the Belo Monte dam.134
Redress by local and indigenous communities was also sought 
under the ILO Convention 169 Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (Compliance 
Committee), which was asked to intervene in the situation regarding 
the construction of the Belo Monte dam. The ILO Compliance 
Committee noted in its recommendations to the Brazilian govern-
ment in 2011 that135 ‘the hydroelectric project could have conse-
quences such as alteration of the navigability of rivers, flora and 
fauna and climate, that affect the peoples living on the lands where 
the project will be located, and which go further than the flooding of 
lands or the displacement of the peoples concerned’.136 The 
Committee asked the Brazilian government ‘to take the necessary 
steps to carry out consultations with the indigenous peoples af-
fected, in accordance with Articles 6 and 15 of the Convention’.137
The Belo Monte dam case study is a telling example of how a 
HRIA framework ought to have been integrated into project devel-
opment stages in Brazil, so as to ensure that projects are designed, 
planned and implemented with a view to reducing environmental 
impacts and protecting indigenous and local communities’ funda-
mental rights.138 This includes, among other measures, establishing 
effective grievance processes and remedies which are accessible to 
indigenous and local communities, in line with Principles 25– 31 of 
the UN Guiding Principles and the premises of Decree 9.571/2018 
on business and human rights.139 A human rights- based approach 
would have added emphasis on participation in terms of questioning, 
broadening the points in time at which participation occurs, the level 
of information sharing involved in participation and consultation ac-
tivities and empowerment and capacity building of local and indige-
nous communities.140 Therefore, a HRIA framework would allow the 
rights to consultation and FPIC to be exercised in a manner that pro-






From the perspective of regional participatory environmental gov-
ernance, a landmark development happened in 2018 with the adop-
tion of the Escazú Agreement, which entered into force in April 
2021. However, Brazil is not 1 of the 12 countries to have ratified the 
Escazu Convention to date,141 and it is unlikely that the country will 
ratify the treaty in the immediate future under the country’s current 
administration. Notwithstanding Brazil’s non- participation and the 
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slow process of ratifications of the treaty to date, the Escazú 
Agreement has been lauded as a landmark treaty for advancing en-
vironmental rights – in particular, environmental ‘access rights’ – in 
the region, and potentially beyond.142
The structure of the Escazú Agreement resembles that of the 
Aarhus Convention.143 Article 4 includes general provisions, which is 
followed by three articles addressing more specifically access to and 
generation and dissemination of environmental information, public 
participation and access to justice.144 Unique to the Agreement is its 
Article 9 on the protection of human rights and environmental de-
fenders, a significant challenge facing indigenous and other environ-
mental and human rights defenders in Brazil and Latin America more 
broadly.145
Only two articles of the agreement explicitly address indigenous 
peoples. The right of indigenous and vulnerable groups to access to 
environmental information is recognized in Article 5(4), which states 
that ‘[e]ach Party shall guarantee that the above- mentioned persons 
or groups in vulnerable situations, including indigenous peoples and 
ethnic groups, receive assistance in preparing their requests and ob-
tain a response’.146 Moreover, according to Article 7(15) ‘[i]n the im-
plementation of the present Agreement, each Party shall guarantee 
that its domestic legislation and international obligations in relation 
to the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities are ob-
served’.147 Other provisions of the agreement have direct relevance 
to indigenous peoples and traditional groups, although not applica-
ble exclusively to them. For example, Article 7(11) states that ‘[w]hen 
the primary language of the directly affected public is different to 
the official languages, the public authority shall ensure that means 
are provided to facilitate their understanding and participation’.148 
Moreover, Article 7(16) states that ‘[t]he public authority shall make 
efforts to identify the public directly affected by the projects or ac-
tivities that have or may have a significant impact on the environ-
ment and shall promote specific actions to facilitate their 
participation’.149 Article 7 (9) of the Agreement further establishes 
standards for the dissemination of decisions resulting from ‘environ-
mental impact assessments and other environmental 
decision- making processes in which the public has participated’, 
which ‘shall be carried out through appropriate means’ and accord-
ing to ‘written, electronic and oral means and customary methods, in 
an effective and prompt manner’.150 Yet the Escazú Agreement has 
been criticized for not explicitly exploring other important issues 
pertinent to indigenous peoples, in particular with regard to the right 
of FPIC, which could have been included under Article 7 concerning 
public participation in environmental decision making.151
Although Brazil is not a party to the Escazú Agreement, domestic 
law incorporates the principles of public participation and consulta-
tion, for example, in the context of environmental licensing and EIA 
procedures. In addition, the right of citizens to request environmen-
tal information from public authorities envisaged in Article 7 of the 
Escazú Agreement is also recognized under Brazilian domestic law. 
The constitutional requirement for access to environmental infor-
mation in Article 5(33) of the Brazilian Constitution152 is imple-
mented by Law 9.985/2000, which states that the public 
administration must provide adequate and clear information to the 
local population.153 Moreover, this legislation requires that environ-
mental licensing be given due publicity.154 The National 
Environmental Policy Act creates a national environmental informa-
tion system, which aggregates all relevant policy and project- related 
information with environmental relevance.155 In addition, the 2003 
Access to Environmental Information Act156 guarantees public ac-
cess to information and data from environmental authorities and 
agencies. The  Act is complemented by the 2011 Freedom of 
Information Law, which guarantees access to information retained 
by any public agency or authority.157 Therefore, Brazilian legislation 
is broadly in line with the requirements of Article 7 of the Escazú 
Agreement as well as with the jurisprudence of the Inter- American 
Court of Human Rights.158 Especially with regard to access rights 
which are already embedded in Brazilian environmental law, the 
added value of the Escazú Agreement stems from the mechanisms 
for implementation and compliance envisaged in the treaty,159 and 
the fact that its adoption makes those participatory environmental 
rights less vulnerable to domestic political changes.
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In contrast to Brazil’s legal framework for indigenous participa-
tion, in Colombia the right to prior consultation appears in several 
pieces of domestic legislation dealing with both environmental and 
indigenous law.160 Under Law 21/1991 implementing ILO Convention 
169, the government shall ‘consult the peoples concerned, whenever 
legislative or administrative measures may directly affect [indige-
nous peoples]’.161 Furthermore, according to Colombia’s General 
Environmental Law (Law 99/1993), the exploitation of natural re-
sources and development of indigenous lands cannot occur without 
prior consultation with the affected indigenous and Afro- Colombian 
communities.162 Although both Colombia and Brazil have afforded 
protection to indigenous rights in their constitutions,163 the 
Colombian Constitutional Court has routinely upheld the commit-
ment to indigenous rights by consistently declaring domestic laws 
unconstitutional if they do not make effective indigenous peoples’ 
fundamental right to participate in decisions that affect their com-
munity.164 Moreover, the Colombian Constitutional Court has re-
cently released a progressive and ground- breaking ruling recognizing 
legal personality and the fundamental right of nature to access to 
justice.165 Brazil’s land tenure protections could be modelled on 
Colombia’s, in which indigenous landholding has contributed to the 
high proportion of private forest ownership.166 As was noted above, 
Brazil’s public ownership regime over indigenous lands under the su-
pervision of FUNAI has largely failed to protect indigenous peoples’ 
property and fundamental rights. Yet despite the stronger judicial 
protection and legal framework, this has not prevented major human 
rights violations against indigenous peoples taking place in the con-
text of the Colombian armed conflict.167 In particular, projects have 
been implemented with brutal forced displacement, mass violence 
and selected killings of indigenous and Afro- Colombian communities 
and have led to significant increases in deforestation in the country, 
with cattle ranching and illegal timber extraction among its main 
causes.168 More recently, on October 2020, the IAComHR referred a 
case to the Inter- American Court of Human Rights after finding that 
the State failed to ensure effective protection of the U’wa’s 
Indigenous Peoples and its members following the execution of a 
series of oil, mining, tourism and infrastructure activities in their 
lands.169
Peru is another Amazon State that has also adopted a compre-
hensive codification of the rights and duties relating to FPIC with 
indigenous groups.170 The 2011 Right to Prior Consultation with 
Indigenous or Tribal Peoples Law171 implements the ILO Convention 
169’s prior consultation requirement. Article 2 of the law grants in-
digenous groups the right to be consulted about legislative or admin-
istrative measures that may affect them, especially those that 
‘directly affect their collective rights concerning their physical exis-
tence, cultural identity, quality of life or development’.172 Under the 
General Environmental Act (Law 28611/2005), public authorities are 
required to promote the participation of indigenous groups and to 
involve them in decision making regarding their environment.173 
Although the right to prior consultation was passed into Peruvian 
law in 2011 in compliance with ILO Convention 169, a significant 
shortcoming is that the right to prior consultation does not entail the 
right to consent, as the government makes a final decision if an 
agreement with indigenous groups is not reached.174 Moreover, Peru 
– like other countries in the region – is yet to find an appropriate 
balance between environmental protection and economic develop-
ment. For example, some domestic laws have created exemptions 
for oil and gas companies from conducting EIAs.175
Beyond the experiences of other Amazon States, several other 
countries have developed successful frameworks for strengthening 
indigenous peoples’ participatory rights in project development and 
FPIC which could be emulated by Brazil. This includes Canada’s 
indigenous- driven mechanisms implementing FPIC, State- driven 
consultation and industry- driven Impact and Benefit Agreements in 
the context of mining policies.176 This has led to transformative 
changes and positive improvements in community engagement in 
different stages of project development.177
ƕՊ |Պ &	!!"
This article has argued that integrating a human rights- based frame-
work into EIA and licensing procedures could have a significant and 
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positive effect on project development in the Amazon with the view 
of safeguarding the protection of the environment and reducing 
the risks of human rights violations. It is unfortunate that with the 
election of the current Brazilian federal government those funda-
mental and environmental rights have been strained to their limits, 
including through the adoption of regressive laws and policies and 
budget cuts to key indigenous and environmental law enforcement 
bodies and agencies, which have significantly contributed to recent 
increases in deforestation rates in the Amazon. However, there have 
been some important advances in recent years in the country, which 
could form the basis for integrating a human rights assessment 
framework into project development, in particular with the passage 
of Decree 9.571/2018 implementing the UN Guidelines on Business 
and Human Rights. Moreover, with the prospects of ratification of 
the Escazú Agreement, Brazil, – and other countries in the region 
– would also go a long way in ensuring that participatory govern-
ance is fully embedded into national environmental laws in a form 
less vulnerable to changes in the political and economic landscapes.
The high rates of deforestation and major human rights viola-
tions committed against indigenous communities in the Amazon rep-
resent the more extreme examples of bad governance of the current 
administration. It falls on the national judiciary and international and 
regional human rights bodies to continue to play their part in act-
ing as a check on the executive powers of the administration, if not 
to halt, at least to making a significant contribution in reducing the 
negative environmental and human rights impacts of developmental 
project activities in the Brazilian Amazon.
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